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Abstract
This paper presents a method1 for a shipper to screen and choose
carriers in a Request For Proposals (RFP) and set up enduring re-
lationships with them. The screening is done using a frontier anal-
ysis model (inscribed within Data Envelopment Analysis or DEA).
The method is compared to a traditional method of selecting carri-
ers through a Mixed Integer Linear Program (MILP).
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1 Introduction
The problem with the traditional method of assigning carriers to lanes
on the basis of their bids on ex ante notional volumes of cargo to trans-
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port is that the shipper is unable to discriminate between those who
will truly be delivering the best effort and those who may engage in op-
portunistic behaviour or otherwise deliver a sub-par service. How is she
to defend herself against carriers being chosen on low prices and in the
future take advantage of demand or other externalities to hold her up?
The point is to select a group of carriers which will be admitted to
bidding in a second round on the basis of their situation on an efficiency
frontier in a multi-dimensional space. The starting point of this re-
search was the observation of a real case in a RFP at a big retailer
in Argentina. This chain counted around 44 supermarket-sized stores
outside of the Buenos Aires conurbation and worked without any for-
mal contract with a large number of different transport firms of several
types and sizes for deliveries to the rest of the country. To unify its dis-
tribution and homogenize its transport supplier pool, it described the
delivery schedule to a total of 42 destinations. The products to be trans-
ported required 3 types of transport: chilled for meat and dairy prod-
ucts, temperature controlled for vegetables and fresh produce and am-
bient curtain-siders for ordinary groceries. A schedule with distances,
hours of departure, hours of delivery and weekly frequencies was an-
nexed to the tender. 25 carriers (who first had to qualify technically on
regulatory, security and fleet requirements) responded, some of which
were already suppliers to this chain, others who were not. All respon-
dents tendered partially: bids covered either some localities or category
of goods or some frequency. In all, 318 bids for a number of trips per year
at a given price each for full truck loads of 24 pallets were received.
The logistics manager in charge of choosing the winner filled the cat-
egories and frequencies according to a ranking of the lowest bids after
dropping outliers and suspiciously low bids. Comparisons were done
with actual prices paid by a benchmarking bread manufacturer and an-
other retail chain (from the same holding company) for similar trips.
The new selection of suppliers and the implied overall transport cost
was compared to the existing transport cost before the auction. The re-
sulting reduction in the number of suppliers and the overall reduction in
transport costs were considered sufficient justification for this exercise.
We wish to try and compare this old tried-and-tested method with a
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new one using efficiency frontier analysis.
We relied on the Monte Carlo method to obtain comparable results.
We consider the case where the principal (shipper) faces uncertainty
about the technology. In a single input multiple output cost setting, she
may for example know that the cost function is increasing and convex,
but otherwise have no a priori information about the cost structure, let-
ting the agent (carrier) potentially charge above the economic rate of
return. In the bidding context, we can interpret this slack term added
to the optimal cost as an information rent (potentially) charged by the
agent. We consider the possibility that the agents have superior infor-
mation about the working conditions, before contracting with the prin-
cipal. A carrier may for example have private information about the re-
turn cargo for the trip back of a specific route. This leads to the classical
adverse selection problem, where an agent will try to extract informa-
tion rents by claiming to be operating under less favorable conditions.
Moreover, the agents may also try to strategically exploit market in-
complete information to claim extra rents for routes, goods and other
services that are subject to lower competitive pressure.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows, in § 2, we re-
view some literature relative to the proposed approach, in § 3 we present
the models which we use here. In § 4, we give the results from each
model, in § 5 we give a managerial interpretation of the outcome as
could be applicable to shippers and carriers alike. We conclude in § 6.
2 Literature review
2.1 Auctions in transport procurement
Literature mostly deals with auction design without consideration of
the carrier selection process or with combinatorial optimization of as-
signments under different constraints leading to solving a Mixed Inte-
ger Linear Program.
A number of papers dating back to Friedman (1956) have considered
the situation faced by bidders who wish to bid on a number of differenti-
ated items that are to be sold with simultaneously opened bids but who
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face a constraint upon the total of their bids. Bundled bids for goods who
have more value to a bidder as a bundle than taken separately have
also been dealt with in the cell phone licence public auctions2. These
auctions take into account interdependencies internal to bidding firms.
External interdependencies should also be taken into account as they
are represented, in the case of the transport industry, by preventive or
predatory bidding by carriers on routes served by larger or better con-
nected carriers to disrupt their established network of lanes or routes.
Elmaghraby and Keskinocak (2004) present a teaching case where The
Home Depot in the United States actively solicited and provided the
necessary tools for carriers to combine bids for routes for the auction
of a forecast total of 52 000 loads over 623 lanes. This same example
is showcased to highlight the difficulties in selecting the winning bids
in a combinatorial auction as a chapter in Elmaghaby and Keskinocak
(2003).
The interest of our approach is to obtain information from the real
bids put in from the carriers so that a shipper can achieve a more sin-
cere notion of the real intrinsic perception of each carrier’s position on a
technological efficiency frontier. It is to be pointed out, however, that
this approach does not purport to explicitly identify or evaluate the
economies of scope achieved by a carrier when he wins a set of lanes,
as defined by Panzar and Willig (1981) and used by Dı´az (1982).
In effect, as has been clearly identified (Klemperer, 1999, Caplice
and Sheffi, 2003, Chen, 2001), the traditional auction mechanism and
bidding processes – the English sealed bid single-round auction – do
not allow the reservation or most efficient bids that the carrier would
be willing to offer to be signalled to the shipper. In fact, the carriers
for want of sufficient information will artificially pad their bids to pro-
tect themselves against uncertainty arising from a host of business and
reputation issues.
Moreover, a carrier will be more interested in submitting a bid if
the traffic generated meshes well with his other lanes and frequencies.
This phenomenon is best captured when the auction is designed to favor
2In which case the goods to be bid upon exhibit “superadditive” values or synergies
when their value is more together than the sum of their individual values.
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combinatorial bids (Kwon et al., 2005). The network interdependency
generated from a network of lanes and frequencies has been modeled in
Dı´az and Basso (2003).
Transport is an especially interesting area to which apply combina-
torial auctions because of the enhanced value of combining several lanes
with the existing network of lane and backhaul possibilities for a car-
rier. Kelly and Steinberg (2000) represent a nice introduction to the key
aspects of a combinatorial auction and give complete references to pre-
vious work. Pekecˇ and Rothkopf (2003) give a good guide to designing
a combinatorial auction including the pitfalls to be avoided. Gallien
and Wein (2005) deals with multi-item auctions for a monopsonistic
buyer and capacity constrained suppliers by designing a “myopic best
response” mechanism to reduce supplier computational burden. How-
ever in this stream of literature, the sole preoccupation of the auction
organizer is cost to the detriment of quality or other considerations.
2.2 Multi-dimensional auctions
Although there are many practical instances of multidimensional auc-
tions, e.g. the conservation reserve program in the USA (cf.e.g. Vukina
and Wossink, 2000), or the Department of Defence procurement auc-
tions for weapon systems in the USA, (cf. e.g. Che, 1993, Bichler, 2000,
Beil and Wein, 2003), the theoretical literature on multi-dimensional
auctions is sparse.
In a standard auction or procurement context, where a single quality
product is supplied, the revenue equivalence between first price and sec-
ond price auctions is the most central result. It was suggested by Vick-
rey (1961), but remained a puzzle until 1981 where Riley and Samuel-
son (1981) and Myerson (1981) simultaneously solved the problem. They
show that in an independent private value model, the different mecha-
nisms give the same expected revenue (or costs) to the principal.
Che (1993) shows how the existing theory can be generalized to mul-
tidimensional auctions. He considers allocating contracts containing a
price p and a one-dimensional quality parameter q. The principal’s con-
cave utility function is monotonous in the quality indicator V (q). An
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agent DMUi that wins a contract earns profit
pii = p− C(q, τ),
where p is the price he is paid, q is the quality he must deliver, τ
is his type and C(q, τ) is his costs of producing quality q. The princi-
pal selects a quasi-linear score function: S(p, q) = V (q) − p. The agents
with highest scores are offered a contract. The exact terms of the con-
tracts depend on which mechanism is chosen. Che (1993) considers two
different mechanisms:
• First score auction - the bidder with the highest score wins and
has to comply with the highest quality standard. A first score auc-
tion can be compared with the first price auction.
• Second score auction - the bidder with the highest score wins
and has to comply with the second highest quality standard. A
score auction can be compared with the second price auction.
He shows an equivalence theorem for the two types of score auctions.
Both auctions are optimal second best mechanisms.
2.3 Data envelopment analysis
However, these auctions often do not enable bidders to put in combined
bids. A case in point is the auction which is presented here. This is
why we have found interesting to introduce a new potential use of DEA,
namely to evaluate non-realized multi-dimensional bids (as opposed to
realized production plans) in a procurement setting (as opposed to a
control setting). In particular, we suggest that an allocation and price
setting mechanism along the lines of the DEA based yardstick schemes,
can be a useful generalization of a second price sealed bid auction mech-
anism.
There is also a great amount of literature on relative performance
evaluations (see van Donselaar et al., 1998, for the results of a survey
of the critical success factors of transport and distribution companies
in Europe). This has been an important theme in the agency literature
ever since the seminal contribution of Holmstrom (1982). The exten-
sion to multiple dimensional performances and the combination with
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frontier models like DEA was initiated in Bogetoft (1997, 2000) and ex-
panded upon in Agrell et al. (2002, 2005). Performance based payment
schemes, where a manager’s bonus depends on his performance rela-
tive to the sector or the market in general, is a prime example. The
first conjectures as to the likely responses to DEA control, go back to
Banker (1980) and Banker et al. (1984). They provided game theoreti-
cal interpretations of the scoring problem in the standard DEA models
given realized inputs and outputs. The study of the ex ante motiva-
tion game of choosing inputs, outputs, efforts, skills etc using formal
agency models was initiated by Bogetoft (1990). One result which in-
terests us concerns the design of incentives for risk neutral agents in
a context with considerable technological uncertainty and asymmetric
information about a regulated agent’s actions (moral hazard) and work-
ing conditions (adverse selection), cf. Agrell and Bogetoft (2001) and
Bogetoft (1997, 2000), and in a dynamic setting Agrell et al. (2002).
3 Models
Let us assume that the principal is risk neutral and that the agents are
either risk averse or risk neutral. The principal’s aim is to minimize
the costs of inducing the agents to take the desired (hidden) actions in
the relevant (hidden) circumstances. An agent’s aim is to maximize the
utility from payment minus the disutility from his private effort.
We consider that the shipper incurs a fixed cost of operation which
is proportional to the number of carriers she works with. To further
refine the comparison between both models, we have added a capacity
constraint on the volume they could carry upon realization of demand.
In the first case, the carriers have tendered for a certain number of
trips per lane but upon realization of demand, they comply with the ad-
ditional requests of the shipper over their trip number that they bid by
adding capacity (possibly by subcontracting from third parties or divert-
ing capacity from some other customer). In the second case, the carrier
cannot exceed the number of trips he committed himself to.
In the following two subsections, we present a model using the effi-
cient frontier analysis and a model using a simple mixed integer linear
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program to minimize the cost of transport using the characteristics de-
scribed in the ex ante tender.
3.1 Efficient Frontier model
The idea behind a frontier analysis model, as the non-parametric Data
Envelopment Analysis, is to create a piecewise linear cost function us-
ing minimal extrapolation in order to compare carriers, as independent
Decision Making Units (DMU), across units and/or over time. The ap-
proach has wide application areas since it does not require any a priori
structural assumptions on the cost function, nor preference information.
The frontier analysis method, considering the bids as bundled bids,
may have several motivations. On the shipper’s side, he may be inter-
ested in only working with a limited number of carriers to limit trans-
action and relationship specific costs. Moreover, and more intricate, he
may look for bundled bids as a way to lower information rents. It is
well known that when an agent produces multiple products under asym-
metric information, and even if there are positive externalities for the
agent, it may pay for a principal to buy in bundles since it provides an
instrument to undermine the informational advantage of the agent, cf.
e.g. Antle et al. (1999). The carriers, Decision Making Units (DMUs),
on the other hand may anticipate that the shipper will buy in bundles
and they may submit prices that reflect this. That is, even if the bids
are officially submitted on a route base, the carriers may have included
discounts (sharing mechanisms) for part of the synergies that may be
involved. The shipper may also in this way accommodate her inability
to forecast the demands correctly. When demands are unknown, the
shipper allocates them to the carrier per order of efficiency.
To formalize the above, each of n DMUs, say DMU i, is assumed to
transform mx controllable inputs xi into my outputs yi. The prices, if
existing, on the controllable inputs and outputs are wi ∈ Rmx+ and pi ∈
Rmy+ .
We assume that the technological possibilities are the same for all
DMUs’ (except for the differences captured by the non-controllable) vari-
ables. Specifically, these possibilities may be thought of as the set T of
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feasible input-output combinations
T = {(x, y)|(x, ) can produce y}
It shall be assumed that generally T satisfy
Condition 1. Free disposability: (x, z, y) ∈ T, x′ ≥ x, 0 ≤ y′ ≤ y =⇒
(x′, z′, y′) ∈ T.
Condition 2. Convexity: T is convex.
Condition 3. r returns to scale, (x, y) ∈ T =⇒ (qx, qy) ∈ T, ∀q ∈ K (r) ,where
k =“crs”,“drs”, or“vrs”, and K(crs) = R0,K (drs) = [0, 1] and K (vrs) =
{1}, respectively.
The associated underlying cost model for a DMU is given by
C(y|w) = min
x
{wx|(x, y) ∈ T}
Given n observations of feasible production plans (xi, yi) the DEA
based cost norm for a DMU facing input costs w and non-controllable
inputs z is
CDEA(.|., .) : Rmy0 × Rmx0 → R
defined as
CDEA(y|w) = minwx
x, λ
s.t. x ≥∑ni=1 λixi
y ≤∑ni=1 λiyi
λ ∈ Γ(r)
(1)
where
Γ(crs) = Rn0 ,
Γ(drs) =
{
λ ∈ Rn0 |
∑
i
λi ≤ 1
}
,
Γ(vrs) =
{
λ ∈ Rn0 |
∑
i
λi = 1
}
.
The DEA based cost function gives the minimal cost of producing the
output for any output vector given the local factor prices and the local
non-controllable conditions.
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If the inputs are unknown and the prices known, one may view the
procurement problem in a different manner: one wishes to explore the
maximum output given known prices and unknown inputs. This situa-
tion naturally translates to the DEA output-oriented problem for a DMU
offering a total bid x for an offer y is FDEA(.|.) : Rmy0 → R defined as
FDEA(y|z) = max φ
φ, λ
s.t. x ≥∑ni=1 λixi
φy ≤∑ni=1 λiyi
λ ∈ Γ(r)
(2)
The output-oriented problem corresponds to the radial expansion of the
offer y to a competitive offer φy at the same or lower cost x.
3.2 Intuition
The way the production possibilities in DEA are estimated has several
implications. The use of the minimal set containing the actual points,
suggests that DEA provides an inner approximation of the underlying
production possibility set. The (in) efficiency estimates are therefore
cautious or conservative in the sense that the potential output expan-
sions or input savings are underestimated. This can be seen for Deci-
sion Making Unit (DMU) D in figure 1 where the expansion possibilities
were estimated as 30% with T ∗ and 100% with T .
The use of the minimal extrapolation principle and hereby, the con-
struction of the largest inner approximation, also implies that the tech-
nology identifies so-called “best practice”. This is attractive in many
cases, since the methods and procedures of the best units are more likely
targets for other units. Thus, for example, if D in figure 1 is to learn, it
would probably find little to learn from looking at F . It would be more
interesting to look at what units like B and perhaps E have done dif-
ferently. A further consequence of using the DEA approach is that real
peers are identified. In figure 1, D has two peers, B and E, since F2 is
located on the line between these two units. B is the primary peer, since
F2 is located close to B.
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Figure 1: The rational ideal evaluation
3.3 Assignment model
The usual method employed to assign carriers to lanes is a mixed inte-
ger linear program of which we have derived two models. In the first,
the carriers are considered as uncapacitated. This means that they
are chosen, independently from the volumes that they will have bid for,
purely on the basis of their bid. They are considered to be able to sub-
contract the required capacity when the realized demand exceeds their
capacity. This, of course, reduces the choice to just one carrier per lane:
the lowest bidder.
The second model assigns the lanes to the carriers taking into con-
sideration their capacity offer (here, this translates into a frequency of
trips per period on the given lane). When the lowest bidder does not
offer sufficient trips, the next lowest is offered the remainder, etc, until
all trips required for that lane are fulfilled.
The decision variable is the number of trips assigned to a carrier j
within the m that submitted bids on a lane i of n that were offered for
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tender. The other variables are:
bi,j : price per trip bid by carrier j on lane i;
ci,j : number of trips bid by carrier j on lane i;
ri : required number of trips on lane i;
carj : 1 if carrier is included in pool of suppliers, 0 otherwise;
Bk =
∑m
j carj ;
Fk : fixed cost of operating with a carrier.
(3)
3.3.1 Uncapacitated model
The decision variable here is
xi,j : binary: assigned to carrier = 1, 0 otherwise j on lane i; (4)
The constraints are written as
∑m
j xi,j ≥ 1, ∀i,
if ci,j = 0,⇒ xi,j = 0, ∀i,∀j,∑n
i xi,j ≤ carj ∗ 40, ∀j, .
(5)
The first constraint specifies that all requirements for each lane be cov-
ered. The second constraint specifies that no lane be attributed to a
carrier that did not bid on it. The last one says that if a carrier is in-
cluded in the pool of suppliers, he must not get more than 10 lanes.
The objective function is a cost minimizing one:
Cuncap = min
( n∑
i
ri
m∑
j
(xi,jbi,j) +BkFk
)
, (6)
whereBk is the total number of carriers retained in the pool of suppliers,
given that Fk is the fixed cost of operating with a given carrier.
3.3.2 Capacitated model
In this case, the decision variable is integer and represents the number
of trips assigned to the carrier. The constraints change somewhat:
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
∑m
j xi,j ≥ ri, ∀i,
if ci,j = 0,⇒ xi,j = 0, ∀i,∀j,
xi,j ≤ ci,j , ∀i,∀j, .
(7)
The objective function becomes:
Ccap = min
( n∑
i
m∑
j
(xi,jbi,j) +BkFk
)
, (8)
The models can be tuned so as to minimize the number of carriers
in the supplier pool by suitably defining the fixed cost Fk. We have enu-
merated in § 4.2 a number of solution sets by increasing the fixed cost
from 0 to a number so large that no further carrier could be culled from
the pool of suppliers without violating the trip requirement constraint.
4 Results with a Monte Carlo simulation
We now compare EFM and the AM ex post: once demand has been re-
vealed using two examples.
The shipper initially puts to tender a vector of 10 volumes over the
10 lanes. The volumes are taken from a uniform distribution between
10 and 30. This data is then used to obtain three groups of carriers: the
first group is obtained by the Efficient Frontier model (EFM), the second
one by the Assignment Model (AM) when the carriers are selected with-
out taking into account their capacities, the fourth is the set of carriers
taking into account the capacity limits specified in their bids.
We have to see how the EFM evolves when in presence of two types of
population. The first type is homogeneous (HomoPop): all prices quoted
by this group of forty carriers come a uniform distribution of prices on
a support [0, 1] (see table 2 on page 24). A second population (Unhom-
Pop) is composed of two subgroups: one subgroup of twenty carriers has
prices using a uniform distribution along the support [0.1], the other
group of twenty has prices coming from a normal distributionN (0.5, 0.2)
(see table 3 on page 25). We look at how the EFM retains the “efficient”
carriers using both populations.
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Because the carriers are not interested by all the lanes, we have gen-
erated a matrix of 400 zeroes and ones uniformly random. The product
of this matrix of zeroes and ones by the matrix of existing bids yields a
sparse matrix of bids from carriers over lanes.
We next generate two samples of 10 000 vectors of 10 demands over
the 10 lanes using two distinct distributions: a uniform and a normal
distribution. The uniform distribution is over the segment [10, 30]. The
normal distribution set has a mean of 20 and standard deviation of 2.5.
4.1 Efficient Frontier Model
In the case of bundled bids, the shipper has at least two problems. One
is to screen the bids to determine the carriers that he wants to involve
in a costly long-term relationships with. The other is to actually assign
the cargo in a given period with given shipping needs to the chosen
carriers. The screening problem can be thought of as an assignment
problem with unknown demand.
The solution involves thus a two-step process.
4.1.1 Screening
The output-oriented DEA formulation 2 can help the screening task.
We may let the columns represent each carrier as a DMU with outputs
equal to the bids offered over the lanes times the volumes and the bids
of this transportation vector as the input. That is, for some possible
demand vector y˜, they may all be part of an optimal assignment. Now
of course, if we introduce some more information about the possible de-
mand vectors we can reduce the number of carriers. This corresponds
to a DEA using some partial price information.
4.1.2 Trip and lane assignment
Turning now to the assignment problem, we must find the cost minimal
combination of carriers that can cover the transportation need on the
10 different lanes. However, this is equivalent to the input based, cost
minimization problem described in (1) in section 3.1. We solve for the
minimal cost corresponding to an output vector y equal to the forecast
14
demand. We obtain a set of 8 carriers when taken from HomPop. For
each carrier we get a proportion of trips for each lane. For example,
carrier 2 gets to carry what capacity he bid on lane 5 only. For Carrier
21, the calculation is slightly more complicated: out of all the volume
attributed to him, 75% will come from trips on lane 7, 10% will come
from both lanes 4 and 5, 4% will come from lane 10 and 1% will come
from lane 8. (see Table 4 on page 26).
4.2 Assignment Model
As mentioned in the description of the model, we use a fixed cost of op-
eration for each carrier included in the pool of transport providers. This
fixed cost can be construed as an administrative cost supported by the
shipper and which includes the cost of monitoring the carrier’s perfor-
mance, communicating with him and other administrative overheads.
By increasing this fixed cost, we progressively make it uneconomical to
include many carriers. We plot in figure 2 on the next page the fixed
cost and the overall transport cost given this reduced number of car-
riers when they care considered to be uncapacitated. For comparison
purposes, the fixed cost has in fact been taken out of this cost. At a
certain level, the number of carriers cannot be decreased any further
without violating the lane and number of trips requirements. The share
of overall transport cost attributed to each carrier retained in the pool
of suppliers when its maximum number is progressively reduced is pre-
sented in Table 5 on page 27.
The minimumminimorum is achieved with only 2 carriers: with less
than that number, some lanes would not be served.
4.3 Results
Once the assignments are made, how does the transport cost evolve
under different volume realizations? Which method provides the most
robust set of suppliers under varying conditions of demands?
We evaluate the resulting variable cost (excluding the fixed cost which
helped us select the carriers) using sets of ten thousand random vectors
of demand and give in table 4 the resulting average and variance of
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Figure 2: The graph plots the evolution of the transport cost (excluding
fixed cost, top curve) when the fixed cost increases and the number of
carriers decreases (bottom curve and points).
the total cost to the shipper. Two samples were generated: one with
uniform distribution with support on [10,30] and the other a normal
distribution with mean 20 and standard deviation 2.5. We further con-
sidered two options: the shipper attributes the volumes to the elected
carriers in the pool without consideration of capacity or she attributes
the volumes taking into account the capacities they had advertised in
their bids. When uncapacitated, the lowest bidder on each destination is
retained. When the carriers are capacitated, the lowest bidder gets the
most trips till his capacity is filled, the remaining requirement is trans-
ferred to the second bidder and if this carrier’s capacity is also filled, the
remaining requirement is passed on to the third bidder, etc till the total
requirement is filled (see table 5).
5 Managerial insight of the outcome
This brings us to the whole purpose of screening the carriers using the
non-parametric frontier method in the first place: when the shipper
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8 carriers AM EFM ∆%
Cap
Uniform
Mean : 17.66
Var. : 7.41
Max: 26.34
Min: 9.05
Mean: 32.68
Var. : 14.54
Max: 45.97
Min: 21.15
+85%
Normal
Mean : 17.66
Var. : 7.41
Max: 26.34
Min: 9.05
Mean : 32.64
Var. : 2.81
Max: 40.30
Min: 26.84
+85%
Uncap
Uniform
Mean : 5.11
Var. : 0.70
Max: 7.28
Min: 2.93
Mean : 9.17
Var. : 1.29
Max: 12.60
Min: 5.61
+79%
Normal
Mean : 5.10
Var. : 0.12
Max: 6.56
Min: 3.75
Mean : 9.16
Var. : 0.22
Max: 11.15
Min: 7.38
+80%
Table 1: Results for each pool of capacitated and uncapacitated retained
carriers of averaging the transport cost over 10 000 realizations of vec-
tors of demands when uniformly and normally distributed when the
initial population of carriers were from an undifferentiated population
(HomPop).
“knows” which of his carriers are “efficient”, he will direct to them any
requirement which were not initially included in the tender. These in-
clude increased frequencies, different trucks or last-minute rush jobs.
An unforeseen event can also be a reduction in the number of trips to
be made per period. Some carriers might take advantage of such a re-
duction to renegotiate the conditions of their participation in the pool of
suppliers. The shipper would be in a better bargaining position if she
knew the position of the carrier on the technological efficiency frontier.
By using the non-parametric frontier method, the logistics manager
knows that his retained bidders are efficient. He may in a second phase
decide to favour them by enticing them to submit new bids on the lanes
in the regions in which they have been identified as being efficient, for
example for controlled temperature cargo.
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One of the interesting features of the EFM is that the shipper is pro-
tected against ex post holdup situations where he might be a victim of
predatory pricing practised by non-efficient carriers in cases unforeseen
in the ex ante tender.
There clearly is a tradeoff between efficiency and cost. As can be
seen in table 4, the extra cost of retaining the efficient carriers ver-
sus the cheapest ones in our simulation amounts to 79 − 85% over the
cheaper alternative. Our controlled setting here does not suppose that
the carriers do not hold up the shipper.
In conclusion, the EFM may be of interest to select the efficient car-
riers, but further research has to be done into which parameters to
include and designing an auction where the statistical data across all
bidders are of the same order of magnitude.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have considered the situation of negative externalities
on the demand side in the number of providers, such as relationship
specific costs and/or fixed contracting costs. We have shown that a non-
parametric screening by an output-oriented formulation of the combina-
torial bids can help to find a minimal subset of providers that span the
tendered task and minimizes the information rents under externalities.
We have shown that this method entails a higher overall cost to the
shipper than a parametric method. The simulation over a sample of
randomly generated demands proves that. The comparison presented
here however cannot capture the extra benefits of the non-parametric
method like increased efficiency or increased ability by the carriers to
stretch their offers to better suit the shipper’s varying transport require-
ments. Our example further is generated using a random number gen-
erator and real life situations would provide data which show significant
differences between carriers. The choice of the efficient ones would thus
generate slightly better results.
Besides this normative interpretation, that may serve as a start-
ing point in a possible qualitative evaluation of the service providers, a
more game theoretic interpretation can be sketched for the discussion.
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Exploiting the high matching costs, a strategic provider may try to sig-
nal an artificially low price (the decoy) for a route to attract a shipper in
anticipation of other (unassigned) volumes at non-competitive rates. A
link-wise auction would fall into such traps and potentially induce high
switch-over or lock-in costs, whereas the non-parametric formulation
promotes balanced offers that span a larger service spectrum.
The deployment of frontier analysis to assess the bidding produc-
tion function furthermore enables the buyer to analyze potentially “soft”
lanes where the relative price per kilometre is significantly above the es-
timated cost norm. This situation may indicate the existence of return
cargo which may be the preserve of some carriers. Depending on rela-
tive and absolute size in the market, the shipper may have the possibil-
ity to act upon such occurrences by promoting market development, e.g.
by declaring multi-carrier selections in a RFP or by directly or indirectly
supporting other providers to offer the particular services. This line of
thought, which is not developed here, could be pursued effectively using
a parametric approach, such as the stochastic frontier analysis (SFA),
to estimate the underlying cost function.
Further research intends to establish whether the formulation has
empirical behavioural support by validation using actual assignments
and bidding patterns in other transport auctions. An additional issue of
interest can be the development of the model to take into account effects
such as the past reactions to exogenous shocks (fuel prices, delays) in
an inter-temporal framework, which might form the basis of a forward-
looking assignment system based on revealed service performance.
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8 Appendix
23
Lane 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Carrier 1 0.825 0.817 0 0.587 0 0 0.474 0.69 0 0
Carrier 2 0 0.118 0 0.194 0 0.337 0.701 0.002 0.506 0
Carrier 3 0 0 0 0.755 0.028 0.254 0.659 0.724 0.89 0
Carrier 4 0.101 0.834 0.523 0.465 0 0 0 0.631 0 0
Carrier 5 0 0 0.593 0 0 0 0 0.72 0.516 0
Carrier 6 0 0.734 0 0 0 0 0.896 0.797 0.127 0.11
Carrier 7 0 0 0.772 0.248 0 0.005 0.825 0.601 0.294 0
Carrier 8 0.196 0.692 0.007 0.337 0.709 0.991 0 0.832 0.823 0
Carrier 9 0 0.443 0 0.073 0.928 0.62 0 0 0.093 0
Carrier 10 0 0.054 0.828 0.727 0.788 0.178 0 0 0 0
Carrier 11 0.449 0 0 0.189 0 0.595 0 0 0.962 0
Carrier 12 0 0.201 0.374 0.992 0 0.32 0.927 0.085 0.624 0
Carrier 13 0.425 0 0.532 0 0.938 0.267 0 0.137 0 0.644
Carrier 14 0 0.447 0.534 0.5 0 0 0.667 0.572 0 0.097
Carrier 15 0 0.009 0 0.475 0 0 0.632 0.748 0 0.019
Carrier 16 0.681 0 0 0.519 0 0.904 0 0.337 0.162 0.847
Carrier 17 0.145 0.392 0.148 0.225 0 0 0 0.531 0.423 0.698
Carrier 18 0 0 0 0 0 0.442 0.259 0.686 0.101 0.467
Carrier 19 0 0.6 0 0.93 0 0.357 0.771 0 0 0.689
Carrier 20 0.003 0 0.515 0.761 0.624 0.186 0 0 0 0
Carrier 21 0 0 0 0.124 0.221 0 0.047 0.109 0 0.295
Carrier 22 0.873 0 0 0 0.441 0.974 0.914 0.723 0 0
Carrier 23 0 0 0.073 0.211 0.348 0.691 0 0 0 0
Carrier 24 0 0.138 0 0.278 0 0.412 0.127 0 0 0
Carrier 25 0.766 0.468 0 0 0.399 0 0 0 0.996 0.878
Carrier 26 0.487 0.078 0 0 0 0 0 0.328 0.613 0
Carrier 27 0 0 0 0.035 0 0 0.518 0 0 0.847
Carrier 28 0 0 0 0.369 0 0 0.09 0.827 0 0
Carrier 29 0.439 0.785 0 0.23 0 0.294 0 0.107 0 0.982
Carrier 30 0 0 0.507 0 0 0.619 0 0.545 0 0
Carrier 31 0.494 0.19 0 0 0 0 0 0.623 0.245 0.387
Carrier 32 0.809 0.393 0 0.069 0 0 0.592 0 0 0
Carrier 33 0.416 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.118
Carrier 34 0 0 0.194 0.941 0 0.204 0.686 0 0 0
Carrier 35 0 0 0 0 0.545 0 0 0.573 0.655 0.854
Carrier 36 0 0 0 0 0 0.346 0 0.413 0 0
Carrier 37 0 0 0 0.395 0 0.433 0 0.409 0.104 0
Carrier 38 0 0.54 0 0.999 0 0 0.166 0 0 0.729
Carrier 39 0 0.998 0 0 0.561 0.345 0 0.195 0.023 0
Carrier 40 0 0 0.029 0 0 0 0 0.913 0.689 0
Table 2: Carrier bids over the lanes which are the basis for both the AM
and the EFM simulations in HomPop.
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Lane 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Carrier 1 0.994 0.643 0 0.997 0 0 0.825 0.136 0 0
Carrier 2 0 0.649 0 0.818 0 0.613 0.641 0.128 0.477 0
Carrier 3 0 0 0 0.713 0.598 0.887 0.105 0.959 0.17 0
Carrier 4 0.447 0.242 0.685 0.112 0 0 0 0.6 0 0
Carrier 5 0 0 0.202 0 0 0 0 0.318 0.52 0
Carrier 6 0 0.418 0 0 0 0 0.97 0.867 0.611 0.0791
Carrier 7 0 0 0.231 0.847 0 0.308 0.381 0.607 0.0998 0
Carrier 8 0.244 0.253 0.337 0.049 0.491 0.283 0 0.45 0.0255 0
Carrier 9 0 0.86 0 0.291 0.607 0.653 0 0 0.235 0
Carrier 10 0 0.445 0.743 0.118 0.335 0.138 0 0 0 0
Carrier 11 0.599 0 0 0.869 0 0.905 0 0 0.512 0
Carrier 12 0 0.166 0.214 0.696 0 0.818 0.897 0.488 0.435 0
Carrier 13 0.411 0 0.66 0 0.82 0.84 0 0.481 0 0.798
Carrier 14 0 0.736 0.684 0.115 0 0 0.218 0.702 0 0.81
Carrier 15 0 0.769 0 0.929 0 0 0.0742 0.94 0 0.65
Carrier 16 0.306 0 0 0.983 0 0.605 0 0.0477 0.174 0.679
Carrier 17 0.867 0.714 0.571 0.0698 0 0 0 0.666 0.36 0.463
Carrier 18 0 0 0 0 0 0.17 0.412 0.196 0.39 0.486
Carrier 19 0 0.00681 0 0.762 0 0.188 0.851 0 0 0.712
Carrier 20 0.233 0 0.459 0.366 0.072 0.723 0 0 0 0
Carrier 21 0 0 0 0.284 0.529 0 0.593 0.705 0 0.507
Carrier 22 0.349 0 0 0 0.57 0.694 0.634 0.707 0 0
Carrier 23 0 0 0.61 0.805 0.769 0.429 0 0 0 0
Carrier 24 0.672 0.534 0 0.383 0 0.481 0.476 0 0 0
Carrier 25 0.327 0.725 0 0 0.831 0 0 0 0.303 0.396
Carrier 26 0.601 0.352 0 0 0 0 0 0.418 0.663 0
Carrier 27 0 0 0 0.743 0 0 0.243 0 0 0.524
Carrier 28 0 0 0 0.705 0 0 0.566 0.594 0 0
Carrier 29 0.714 0.477 0 0.533 0 0.799 0 0.572 0 0.372
Carrier 30 0 0 0.576 0 0 0.448 0 0.618 0 0
Carrier 31 0.542 0.65 0 0 0 0 0 0.711 0.621 0.564
Carrier 32 0.567 0.454 0 0.234 0 0 0.313 0 0 0
Carrier 33 0.369 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.575
Carrier 34 0 0 0.48 0.303 0 0.2 0.559 0 0 0
Carrier 35 0 0 0 0 0.401 0 0 0.688 0.315 0.501
Carrier 36 0 0 0 0 0 0.737 0 0.288 0 0
Carrier 37 0 0 0 0.295 0 0.574 0 0.353 0.541 0
Carrier 38 0 0.515 0 0.299 0 0 0.455 0 0 0.44
Carrier 39 0 0.452 0 0 0.418 0.784 0 0.431 0.28 0
Carrier 40 0 0 0.0772 0 0 0 0 0.749 0.518 0
Table 3: Carrier bids over the lanes which are the basis for both the AM
and the EFM simulations in UnhomPop.
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DMU Inverted Fo(x, y) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
score
Carrier 1 0.1266 7.899 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Carrier 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
Carrier 3 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
Carrier 4 0.0812 12.313 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Carrier 5 0.1074 9.312 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Carrier 6 0.3909 2.558 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Carrier 7 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0.99 0 0 0 0
Carrier 8 1 1 0 0 0.95 0.02 0.02 0 0 0 0 0
Carrier 9 0.5739 1.743 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Carrier 10 0.2698 3.706 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Carrier 11 0.1822 5.489 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Carrier 12 0.1402 7.130 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Carrier 13 0.1027 9.737 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Carrier 14 0.2460 4.065 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Carrier 15 1 1 0 0.71 0 0 0 0 0.01 0 0 0.28
Carrier 16 0.1737 5.757 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Carrier 17 0.1767 5.660 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Carrier 18 0.4427 2.259 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Carrier 19 0.1093 9.149 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Carrier 20 0.2336 4.280 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Carrier 21 1 1 0 0 0 0.1 0.1 0 0.75 0.01 0 0.04
Carrier 22 0.1237 8.087 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Carrier 23 0.4320 2.315 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Carrier 24 1 1 0.95 0.01 0 0 0 0 0.04 0 0 0
Carrier 25 0.1274 7.849 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Carrier 26 0.1918 5.213 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Carrier 27 1 1 0 0 0 0.99 0 0 0 0 0 0.01
Carrier 28 0.8707 1.149 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Carrier 29 0.1201 8.325 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Carrier 30 0.0592 16.898 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Carrier 31 0.1447 6.912 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Carrier 32 0.4445 2.250 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Carrier 33 0.4140 2.416 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Carrier 34 0.2015 4.962 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Carrier 35 0.1486 6.730 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Carrier 36 0.0565 17.689 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Carrier 37 0.3532 2.831 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Carrier 38 0.3734 2.678 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Carrier 39 1 1 0 0 0 0 0.01 0 0 0 0.98 0
Carrier 40 0.7025 1.423 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 4: EFM results for screening and freight assignment in HomPop,
only 8 carriers are retained.
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Trips Carrier : number of trips
Lane 1 14 8 : 6 20 : 8 −.−
Lane 2 28 12 : 13 19 : 15 −.−
Lane 3 19 5 : 13 40 : 6 −.−
Lane 4 26 4 : 2 8 : 10 17 : 14
Lane 5 13 20 : 13 −.− −.−
Lane 6 25 10 : 13 18 : 11 19 : 1
Lane 7 27 3 : 18 15 : 9 −.−
Lane 8 25 1 : 8 2 : 10 16 : 7
Lane 9 27 3 : 3 7 : 16 8 : 8
Lane 10 10 6 : 6 29 : 4 −.−
Table 5: Table of lane attribution in AM when the carrier’s trip capacity
is taken into account as the fixed cost is 0.
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